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Note
People v. Fitzpatrick: The Path to Amending the

Illinois Constitution to Protect Child Witnesses
in Criminal Sexual Abuse Cases
Then call them to our presence.
Face to face,
And frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear
The accuser and the accused freely speak.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Reports of child abuse and neglect are rising at an alarming rate.2 In
1992 alone, 2,855,691 children were reportedly abused or neglected
nationwide.' Nationally, 129,982 of these children were reported to
have been victims of sexual abuse.4 With 12,019 reported cases of
sexual abuse,5 Illinois accounted for almost ten percent of all reported
cases of child sexual abuse in the country. The sheer volume of
reported cases in Illinois depicts the magnitude of this state's child
abuse problem. 6 Moreover, the actual number of incidents of sexual
abuse, including those cases never reported, is likely much higher.'
I. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD THE SECOND, act 1, sc. 1 (Alfred Harbage ed.,
Pelican, 1984).
2. The number of reported incidents in Illinois has nearly tripled between 1982 and
1992 from 111,736 reports to 322,748 reports. ILLINOIS DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY
SERVS., CHILD ABUSE

&

NEGLECT STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT-FISCAL YEAR 1992 7

(1993) [hereinafter 1992 ABUSE & NEGLECT STATISTICS].
3.

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 214 (1994).

Of those reported cases, nearly 40% involved physical or sexual abuse. Id. at 213.
4. Id.
5. 1992 ABUSE & NEGLECT STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 19. Of the total number of
reported sexual abuse cases, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
("DCFS") investigators found credible evidence to conclude that 5346 of those cases
occurred. Id. Of the 5346 indicated cases, 1709 took place in the Chicago region. Id. at
21. More than half of the alleged perpetrators in criminal sexual abuse cases were
parents, step-parents, parental substitutes, or blood relations. Id. at 24. The children
involved in these incidents varied in age, but 50.4% of the children were under the age of
nine, and 23.9% of the children were under the age of five. Id.
6. Id.
7. A DCFS report acknowledges this fact noting that:
The actual number of sexually abused children in Illinois (and in the United
States) is unknown. A child victim may not disclose a sexual assault for fear
of rejection, blame, or punishment. Parents themselves may not report the
sexual abuse of their children fearing that an investigation of the incident
would be more damaging than any physical or emotional harm the child might
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In response to the increasing number of reported child abuse cases, 8
many states have adopted laws designed to facilitate the prosecution of
child abuse offenders and to protect children in the courtroom. 9 The
statutes utilize procedures such as videotaped testimony, screening
devices to prevent the defendant from seeing a child witness, and oneway closed-circuit television systems.'0
Illinois, like most other. states, adopted many programs and procedures toprotect child-victims of abuse,". and also enacted legislation
to protect children while testifying in the courtroom.' 2 In 1991, the
Illinois General Assembly passed the Child Victims of Sexual Abuse
Act 3 (the "Child Shield Act"), to facilitate the prosecution of child
sexual abuse cases and to protect child-victim witnesses. 4 This Act
permits sexually abused 5 children to testify by means of closed-circuit
still
television outside the presence of their alleged attackers, 6 while
17
children.
the
cross-examine
to
attorney
defendant's
the
allowing
On February 17, 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the
Child Shield Act as unconstitutional in the case of People v.

have experienced from the assault. While national estimates of sexual abuse
of children are approximately 16 percent of all reported child abuse, the true
incidence may be much higher.
1992 ABUSE & NEGLECT STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 16.
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 214
(1994). For example, from 1991 to 1992, the number of reported child abuse and
neglect cases in the United States increased from 2,689,193 to 2,855,691. Id.
9. See Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1985) [hereinafter Testimony of Child
Victims] (explaining the development of statutes allowing videotaped testimony in the
states as a response to the growing problem of sexual abuse); People v. Bastien, 541
N.E.2d 670, 672 (111. 1989) (recognizing that the Illinois General Assembly, like many
other state legislatures, has adopted laws allowing videotaped testimony in response to
the escalating problem of child sexual abuse).
10. See Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 9, at 813-23; see also Bastien, 541
N.E.2d at 672-73 (explaining the various devices, known as child shield laws, that the
states use to prevent child witnesses from seeing the defendant).
11. See infra note 109.
12. Illinois first attempted to protect child-victim witnesses in 1987. See infra part
II.D.
13. Act of Dec. 14, 1994, Pub. Act No. 88-674, § 106B-5, 1994 Ill. Legis. Serv.
2664-65 (West) (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-5)
[hereinafter 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment].
14. See infra part II.D.
15. For purposes of this Note, the term "sexual abuse" refers to certain statutory sex
crimes. See infra note 115 (specifying the applicable crimes and statutory references).
16. 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5/106B-5. See infra note
114 for the text of the amended Child Shield Act.
17. 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5/106B-5(b).
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8 In a five-to-two decision,
Fitzpatrick."
the court held in Fitzpatrick
that the confrontation clause of the Illinois Constitution 9 guarantees an
accused the absolute right to confront a testifying witness.20 In
reaching this conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Craig,2 '
which reached the opposite conclusion, was inapplicable.22 The
Fitzpatrick court distinguished the language of the Illinois 23 and the
United States 24 Constitutions, holding that the face-to-face language in
the Illinois Constitution requires child-victims in criminal sexual abuse
proceedings to meet their accuser face-to-face, regardless of the harm
that the confrontation may cause the child.'
In order to obviate the effects of Fitzpatrick,the Illinois General
Assembly quickly passed a bill amending the Illinois Constitution.26
The bill amended the Illinois Constitution's Confrontation Clause by
deleting the "face to face" language and replacing it with language
giving the accused the "right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him or her., 27 On November 8, 1994, Illinois voters approved
the constitutional amendment 28 and completed the process of
nullifying the Fitzpatrickdecision. As a result, Illinois courts may
once again employ the use of closed-circuit television to protect child
sexual abuse victims.

18. 633 N.E.2d 685, 689 (I11.
1994).
19. Article I, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides in pertinent
part: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and have a copy
thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face .. " ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8 (amended
1994) (emphasis added).
20. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688-89.
21. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
22. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688.
23. See supra note 19 for the text of the confrontation clause contained in the 1970
Illinois Constitution.
24. The United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
25. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688-89.
26. See infra part III.B.
27. GEORGE H. RYAN,SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTTUTON OF ILLINOIS (1994) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].

28. See Michelle Stevens, Child Witness Law Imperils Rights, CHI. SuN TIMES, Nov.
14, 1994, at 31. Illinois voters overwhelmingly approved the amendment. Id.; see also
infra note 163.
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This Note first traces the history and meaning of the Confrontation
Clauses of the United States2 9 and the Illinois Constitutions.30 It then
briefly traces Illinois' passage of the current Child Shield Act.3' Next,
this Note discusses the facts and opinions of the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Fitzpatrick,32 and then discusses the constitutional
amendment resulting from that decision.3 3 This Note then analyzes the
Fitzpatrick decision and the resulting constitutional amendment.35
Next, it explores the impact that the Fitzpatrickdecision will likely
have on future constitutional interpretation by the Illinois Supreme
Court, 36 and the right to confrontation in Illinois in general. 37 Finally,
this Note concludes that the Fitzpatrickdecision signals a change in the
Illinois Supreme Court's constitutional analysis.38
II.BACKGROUND
A. HistoricalBackground and JudicialInterpretationof the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution
The right to confront an accuser face-to-face can be traced back to
Roman law.3 9 Common law also recognized the right to confront an
accuser, but did not require face-to-face confrontation. Instead, the
primary purpose of the common-law right of confrontation was to
enable cross-examination."
29. See infra parts lI.A-B.
30. See infra part II.C.
31. See infra part II.D.
32. See infra part III.A.
33. See infra part III.B.
34. See infra part IV.A.
35. See infra part IV.B.
36. See infra part V.A.
37. See infra part V.B.
38. See infra part VI.
39. The majority opinion in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), relied on a
statement by the Roman Governor Fetus. Id. at 1015-16. In deciding whether to give up
his prisoner, Fetus stated: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to
die before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to
defend himself against the charges." Id. (quoting Acts 25:16 (Revised Standard
Version)).
40. Id. at 1018 n.2 (citing 5 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1974)). In referring to the right of confrontation at common law, the
Court quoted Wigmore who wrote: "'There was never at common law any recognized
right to an indispensable thing called confrontation as distinguished from crossexamination. There was a right to cross-examination as indispensable, and that right
was involved in and secured by confrontation .
Id. (quoting WIGMORE, supra).
I..'
41. Id. ' Wigmore reasoned that "'if the accused has had the benefit of cross-
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The right to confront an accuser under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution is firmly rooted in federal jurisprudence.42
The Supreme Court originally held that the Confrontation Clause
grants an accused the right to cross-examine an opposing witness and
to meet the witness face-to-face. 3 The Court later refined its position
on the right to
face-to-face confrontation, stating that it was only a
"preference." 44 Thus, the Court concluded that the primary purpose of
the Federal Confrontation Clause is to provide the opportunity for
cross-examination, coupled with a preference for physical confrontation.45
The right of confrontation is deemed essential to the fact-finding
process because most courts presume that witnesses are less likely to
lie in the presence of the person that they are accusing.46 It is also
examination, he has had the very privilege secured to him by the Constitution."' Id.
(quoting WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 1397, at 158).
42. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (noting that the
Sixth Amendment grants accused individuals the right to be confronted by their accusers
and to cross-examine the witnesses).
43. In Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), the Court stated the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause as follows:
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be
proved against the accused . . . except by witnesses who confront him at the
trial upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to crossexamine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by
the established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases.
Id. at 55 (emphasis added). See also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911)
(stating that the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution was intended "to
secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of crossexamination.").
44. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). In explaining the validity of hearsay
exceptions, the Court emphasized that the Confrontation Clause "reflects a preference
for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that 'a primary interest secured by [the
provision] is the right of cross-examination."' Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415, 418 (1965)) (footnote omitted).
45. Id.; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990). In reviewing the
history of the Confrontation Clause, the Craig Court noted:
[T]he right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause includes not only a
"personal examination," but also "(1) insures that the witness will give his
statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the
matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury;
(2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the 'greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth'; [and] (3) permits the jury that
is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in
making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility."
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
46. The Court Coy evaluated the function of a physical confrontation at trial and
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important to the function of the jury that the jurors have an opportunity
to observe the witnesses, as they face the accused, to judge the
veracity of the testimony in light of cross-examination. 4
The right to a face-to-face confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, however, is not absolute. 48 The Court has long recognized the
validity of many hearsay exceptions.49 In Ohio v. Roberts,5 ° the Court
thoroughly examined the Confrontation Clause in light of the Federal
Rules of Evidence."' In deciding whether to admit an out-of-court
statement made by a non-testifying declarant, the Court sought to
balance the accused's right to confront the out-of-court declarant with a
State's interest in effective law enforcement.52 The Court emphasized
stated:
It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person "to his face" than "behind
his back." In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told
less convincingly. The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the
witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere,
but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions. Thus the right to face-toface confrontation serves much the same purpose as a less explicit component
of the Confrontation Clause that we have had more frequent occasion to
discuss-the right to cross-examine the accuser ....
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20.
47. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43. The Court, in describing the function of the
Confrontation Clause, noted:
[P]ersonal examination and cross-examination of the witness [provide] . . .
the accused . . . an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added).
48. Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 330. The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause
"intended to secure the right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face, and to thus
sift the testimony produced against him, has always had certain well recognized
exceptions." Id.
49. See, e.g., Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244-50 (recognizing the validity of the dying
declaration hearsay exception); see also FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 (listing numerous
hearsay exceptions). For example, although in each instance the declarant will not
testify in court and thus the defendant cannot literally confront the declarant, the court
will admit an excited utterance, FED. R. EvID. 803(2); an identification of a person after
perceiving the person, FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(C); and testimony given at another
hearing of the same or different proceeding if the defendant or a predecessor in interest
with a similar motive had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(1).
50. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5 1. Id. at 62-66.
52. Id. at 64. In Roberts, the defendant was charged with possession of stolen credit
cards. Id. at 58. At a preliminary hearing, the defense unsuccessfully tried to cause the
witness to admit that she gave the defendant the stolen credit cards, and that she gave
him permission to use them. Id. At trial, the prosecution was unable to produce the
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that if the Confrontation Clause were read literally, "the Clause would
abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as
unintended and too extreme. 53 Thus, the Court reaffirmed 4 that the
use of hearsay statements of an unavailable declarant does not violate
the Confrontation Clause.
The Court has also adhered to this conclusion in criminal sexual
abuse cases when applying hearsay exceptions such as the spontaneous declaration exception 56 and the exception for statements made
to medical personnel. For example, in White v. Illinois,58 the Court
rejected the petitioner's argument for establishing a new rule excluding
hearsay statements unless the court first finds the declarant unavailable.5 9 The Court reasoned that the declarant's availability is
immaterial where there are other guarantees that the hearsay statements
are reliable and therefore probative.6
witness after attempting to serve five subpoenas. Id. at 59. The trial court admitted the
prior testimony of the witness denying that she had given the stolen credit cards to the
defendant and had given him permission to use them. Id. at 60. The defendant was
convicted. Id.
The Court, in reviewing the hearsay exception, emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that the primary
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the right of cross-examination. Id. at
63 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 330 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
53. Id. at 63.
54. See supra note 48.
55. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 77.
56. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
57. FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
58. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992). In White, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of
a four-year-old based primarily on hearsay statements. Id. at 739. The Illinois
Appellate Court held that the trial court properly admitted the hearsay statements and,
further, that it was not necessary for the court to find that the child was unavailable
before it admitted the child's statements. Id. at 740. The Illinois Supreme Court denied
discretionary review, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
59. Id. at 744. The Court reaffirmed and clarified its prior rulings in Roberts, 448
U.S. at 77, and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986). White, 112 S. Ct. at
740-42. The White Court stated that "Roberts stands for the proposition that
unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only
when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial
proceeding." Id. at 741. The Court then reviewed its decision in Inadi. Id. at 741-42.
The issue in Inadi was whether the admission of a statement of a co-conspirator violates
the Constitution. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 391. In rejecting the unavailability requirement,
the Court noted that an unavailability requirement would "do little to improve the
accuracy of factfinding, [and] it is likely to impose substantial additional burdens on the
factfinding process" because the prosecution would continuously have to keep track of
all such witnesses. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742.
60. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742-43. The Court further noted that "[t]o exclude such
probative statements under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause would be the
height of wrong-headedness, given that the Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose
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As such, the Court held that the prosecution may admit a child's
excited utterances made in response to sexual abuse, and statements
made to medical personnel for the purposes of examination and treatment, without showing the unavailability of the declarant. 6' Thus, the
Court interpreted the Federal Confrontation Clause to allow certain
witness statements without face-to-face confrontation or proof of
unavailability.62
B. The Supreme Court Evaluates Child Shield Laws under the
Sixth Amendment: Coy v. Iowa 63 and Maryland v. Craig 64
Until 1988, the Court's decisions addressing exceptions to the
defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment primarily concerned hearsay statements and restrictions on the scope of
cross-examination. 65 In 1988,in Coy v. Iowa, the Court examined an
Iowa statute66 that allowed a child sexual abuse victim to testify with a
screen placed between the defendant and the child-accuser or via
closed-circuit television. 67 Although the Court held that the statute
violated the Confrontation Clause, 68 it reiterated that the right to face-

the promotion of the 'integrity of the factfinding process."' Id. at 743 (quoting Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)).
61. Id. at 744.
62. Id. See generally Anthony C. Porcelli, Sixth Amendment-Right to Confront
One's Accuser when the Victim Does Not Testify: White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736
(1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 868, 879-84 (1993) (arguing that the decision in
White is sufficiently limited by the Compulsory Process Clause to prevent the
infringements of the rights of criminal defendants). But see Nancy H. Baughan, Recent
Developments: White v. Illinois: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court's
Preferencefor Out-of-Court Statements, 46 VAND. L. REV. 235, 253-56 (1993) (arguing
that the decision in White further eroded Confrontation Clause protection for criminal
defendants by restricting the necessity of finding a declarant unavailable pursuant to
Coy and Craig, which could eventually permit the admission of hearsay that does not
serve the goals of the Confrontation Clause).
63. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
64. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
65. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016. The Court cited cases such as Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980), and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), as cases which address out-of-court
statements, and Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), and Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974), as cases which address limitations on cross-examination. Id.
66. The statute analyzed in Coy provided in pertinent part: 'The court may require a
party be confined [sic] to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the
party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child
to see or hear the party." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting
IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987) (amended 1993)).
67. Id. at 1014.
68. Id. at 1022. The Court noted that "[ilt is difficult to imagine a more obvious or
damaging violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter." Id. at 1020.
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to-face confrontation is not absolute.69
The Court indicated a willingness to revisit the issue,7" and
articulated guidelines for states to follow in attempting to formulate
legislation designed to shield child-victim witnesses. 7 ' According to
the Coy Court, state legislatures could create an exception to face-toface confrontation to protect child-victims in abuse cases if: (1) the
legislation required an individualized finding that the child would in
fact be harmed if required to testify in the presence of the defendant;
(2) the state advanced an important public policy; and (3) the right of
the accused to cross-examine the child remained unfettered.7
Subsequently, in Maryland v. Craig,73 the Court expressly created
an exception to the preference for face-to-face encounters under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in the context of child
abuse victims. 74 The Maryland statute 7 at issue permitted a child69. Id. at 1020-21. The Court stated that "ilt is true that we have in the past indicated
that rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to
other important interests.... Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only
when necessary to further an important public policy." Id.
70. Id. The Court stated: "We leave for another day, however, the question whether
any exceptions exist." Id. at 1021. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, was
more direct. She stressed: "I wish to make clear that nothing in today's decision
necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses." Id. at
1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 1021.
72. Id. At no point in the opinion was cross-examination explicitly an issue.
Instead, most of the Confrontation Clause discussion focused on the Court's longstanding view that cross-examination was the primary purpose of the Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 1020. Accordingly, the requirement of cross-examination can be assumed.
See id.
73. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
74. Id. at 860 (holding that one-way closed-circuit television could be used for
examining a child abuse victim if the court found such accommodation to be necessary).
75. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 9-102(a)-(d) (1989) (amended 1992),
stated in relevant part:
(a)(l) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law
Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony of a childvictim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of
a closed circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the judge
may question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to be
unobtrusive.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the courtroom with the child when
the child testifies by closed circuit television:
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victim of criminal sexual abuse to testify by means of one-way closedcircuit television if the trial judge determined that the child-victim
would suffer "serious emotional distress such that the child 7cannot
6
reasonably communicate" if required to testify in the courtroom.
The Craig Court determined that the Maryland statute comported
with the central concern of the Confrontation Clause: "[T]o ensure the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it
to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the
trier of fact."' 77 The Court explicitly defined the Sixth Amendment
confrontation right as including the right to a face-to-face confrontation, the requirement that a witness be competent to testify under
oath, the right to cross-examine the witness, and the right to have the
trier-of-fact observe the witness. 78 The Court concluded, however,
that not all four aspects of confrontation must be present to comport
with the Sixth Amendment,
and created a specific exception for child
79
sexual abuse victims.

Based on the Court's decision in Craig,therefore, states are free to
enact legislation to protect child-victim witnesses provided that the
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the
opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including a
person who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the
abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge and the
defendant shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the
persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate
electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney
pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant
in the courtroom at the same time.
Id. The Maryland legislature amended the statute in 1992 to require a judge to determine
"that testimony by the child victim in the defendant's presence will result in the child
suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROc. § 9-102(a)(2) (1989) (amended
1992).
76. Id.
77. 497 U.S. at 845.
78. Id. at 846. The Court concluded that an exception to the right to a face-to-face
encounter is similar to the hearsay exceptions that allow admission of statements
against a defendant, "despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at trial."
Id. at 847-48.
79. Id. at 857.
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statute requires that the State show the following: (1) the use of oneway closed-circuit television is necessary to protect the welfare of the
child witness; (2) the child witness would be traumatized by the presence of the defendant, and not just the courtroom generally; and (3)
the State is furthering an important public policy., °
C. The Illinois Confrontation Clause Prior
to People v. Fitzpatrick
Prior to the 1994 constitutional amendment,8 the Illinois Confrontation Clause guaranteed an accused the right "to meet the witness face
to face ...."2 Because this language differs from the Confrontation
Clause in the United States Constitution, it is necessary to review the
legislative history and supreme court precedent interpreting the Illinois
Confrontation Clause.
1. Legislative History of the Illinois Confrontation Clause
Prior to the constitutional amendment, the Bill of Rights section of
the Illinois Constitution had contained face-to-face language since
Illinois adopted its first Constitution in 1818.83 At the Constitutional
Convention of 1870, delegates examined the clause and passed it
8
without debate. 84 At the Constitutional Convention of 1970, 1
80. Id.
8 1. In response to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Fitzpatrick, 633
N.E.2d 685 (I11.
1994), the Illinois General Assembly proposed, and the voters ratified,
a constitutional amendment changing the language of the Illinois Confrontation Clause
to parallel the language of the Federal Confrontation Clause. See infra part III.B.
82. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8.
83. Article VIII, section 9 of the Illinois Constitution of 1818 reads:
That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard by
himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his favor; and in prosecutions by indictment or
information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage, and
that he shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.
ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 9 (emphasis added), reprinted in ANNOTATED STATUTES OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN FORCE MAY 1, 1896, 55, 65 (Merritt Starr & Russell H. Curbs
eds., 2d ed. 1896).
84. 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS 1573 (1870). When the Bill of Rights section of the Illinois Constitution was

brought to the floor, the notes indicate only that section 10 of the Bill of Rights was
agreed upon and passed without further debate. Id.
85. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1373-

76 (1970) [hereinafter RECORD]. The forward to the Record of Proceedings also explains
the drafters' intent: "The intent of the delegates, as contained in these debates, ... [is
to] contribute to the understanding, implementation, and continued interpretation of the
new Illinois Constitution." Id. at III.
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however, the delegates discussed in some detail the intent of the faceto-face language.86 During this discussion, one delegate expressed his
belief that the Confrontation Clauses of the Illinois and Federal
Constitutions were meant to protect the same interests.87 Thus, the
Illinois General Assembly understood that the Illinois Confrontation
Clause protected the same interests as the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, despite the difference in language.88
2. Decisions of the*Illinois Supreme Court Concerning the
Illinois Confrontation Clause
The Illinois Supreme Court generally has followed the "lockstep
doctrine, 8 9 of constitutional interpretation when confronted with
hearsay exceptions and confrontation clause analysis. 90 Under the
lockstep doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court follows the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court when interpreting similar provisions
of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. 9'

86. RECORD, supra note 85, at 1373; see supra note 19 for the text of the
Confrontation Clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.
87. RECORD, supra note 85, at 1373. Mr. Pechous, a delegate on the Bill of Rights
Committee, specifically emphasized that:
Talking about section 9 of the 1870 bill of rights, basically section 9 is
reflected by-the same rights are reflected in the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution . . . [and] it reflects, completely, the same rights
and the same guarantees as reflected in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
Mr. Pechous explained that the rights and guarantees included, among others, "the
right to confrontation of opposing witnesses" as set forth in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965). Id. In Pointer, the Court noted that "a major reason underlying the
constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with [a] crime an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him." 380 U.S. at 406-07.
88. According to the transcripts of the 1970 convention, one proposed amendment
would have substituted the language of the Federal Confrontation Clause for that in the
Illinois Constitution. RECORD, supra note 85, at 1373. Nevertheless, the Chairman
indicated that the Bill of Rights Committee members simply "liked" the original
language because it was "wholly adequate." Id. Thus, the Committee voted to retain the
language. Id.
89. For a historical discussion of the lockstep doctrine, see Douglas M. Poland, Note,
People v. DiGuida: Freedom of Expression on Private Property Under the Illinois
Constitution, 24 LoY. U. CHm. L.J. 523, 538-58 (1993).
90. People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336, 342 (I11.1992); see Poland, supra note 89, at
538-58.
91. See, e.g., People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 156 (I1l. 1984) (holding that Illinois
courts should follow Supreme Court decisions when interpreting similar provisions of
the federal and state constitutions).
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Applying this doctrine, Illinois courts have held that hearsay exceptions are constitutional under the Illinois Constitution,92 just as
federal courts have held that hearsay exceptions are constitutional
under the United States Constitution.93 Moreover, in the context of
oral hearsay exceptions, the Illinois Supreme Court has generally
construed the Confrontation Clause of the Illinois Constitution 94 as
protecting the same rights that exist under the United States
Constitution. 95 These rights include both the right
9 of cross-examiface-to-face.
accuser
an
meet
to
right
the
and
nation
In People v. Tennant,97 the Illinois Supreme Court held that so long
as the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine a
witness, testimony given at a preliminary hearing could be admitted
into evidence.98 Relying on both Dean Wigmore's treatise and prior
92. Certain hearsay statements and documents are admissible under Illinois law. See,
e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/115-10.1 (West 1992) (allowing the admission
of prior inconsistent statements); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/115-5 (West
1992) (allowing the admission of business records); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725,
§ 5/115-5.1 (1992) (allowing the admission of coroner's reports); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 725, § 5/115-5.1 (West 1992) (allowing the admission of medical reports).
Additionally, Illinois courts have long held that the admission of hearsay statements
and documents is consistent with the Illinois Confrontation Clause. For example, the
admissibility of testimony taken at a preliminary hearing of a declarant who died prior
to trial was first considered in Barnett v. People, 54 I11.325 (1870). The court held that
a witness who heard and remembered the testimony of the decedent could testify at a later
trial as to the statements of the decedent. Id. at 330. The defendant argued that the
admission of the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Illinois
Constitution. In response the court stated: "[T]he supposed constitutional objection
[does not] arise to such evidence, as the witness was confronted with the accused, and he
was afforded an opportunity of cross-examination in open court." Id.
93. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 19.
95. See, e.g., People v. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Ill. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 918 (1977). In Tennant, the defendant challenged the use of testimony given
at a preliminary hearing. Id. at 1117. The defendant had a chance to cross-examine the
witness at the preliminary hearing. Id. At trial, the court admitted the prior testimony
because the witness had died. Id. at 1121. The court reasoned that "[d]espite the
language difference, the two clauses are meant to protect the same interest." Id. at 1119.
96. See, e.g., Potts v. People, 224 N.E.2d 281, 283 (I11. 1967) (stating that the
essential protection available at a criminal trial is the requirement under this clause that
the accused shall have the ight to appear, defend in person, and meet the witnesses faceto-face); People v. Sorrells, 127 N.E. 651, 653 (I11.1920) (stating that a defendant has a
ight to be confronted with those who testify against him); Tucker v. People, 13 N.E.
809, 811 (111. 1887) (holding that the Constitution guarantees a right to cross-examine
and confront witnesses); People v. McCambry, 578 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct.)
(stating that the Confrontation Clause was primarily designed to secure the defendant's
right to cross-examine witnesses who appear against him), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d
136 (I11. 1991).
97. 358 N.E.2d 1116 (Ill. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
98. Id. at 1121.
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United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal Confrontation Clause, the Tennant court stressed that the central function of the
confrontation clause of the Illinois Constitution was to secure for the
defendant the right to cross-examine a witness. 99 Under the reasoning
in Tennant, the mandates of the Illinois Confrontation Clause are met
once a defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine a witness.'00
Illinois courts have also held that the admission of some hearsay
statements does not violate a defendant's confrontation rights under the
Illinois Constitution.' 1 For example, Illinois courts have admitted
statements made to medical personnel in child abuse cases.' °2 The
Illinois Supreme Court has also allowed the spontaneous declaration
hearsay exception in child abuse cases, regardless of the availability of
the witness.' °
Moreover, in People v. Wittenmyerj'O the Illinois Supreme Court
declined to adopt procedural safeguards for recording hearsay state-

99. Id. at 1119.
100. Id. at 1121; see also People v. Ferguson, 101 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1951)
(explaining that "the constitutional right of confrontation (section 9 of article II) is
designed to secure to an accused the right to cross-examine the witnesses who testify
against him."), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 910 (1952).
101. See, e.g., Sokel v. People, 72 N.E. 382, 384 (Ill. 1904) (admitting a marriage
certificate written in Hebrew as evidence of a marriage); Tucker v. People, 13 N.E. 809,
811-12 (Ill. 1887) (holding that the right to face-to-face confrontation under the Illinois
Constitution has "no reference to record evidence," and therefore admitting a record from
the county clerk). The Illinois rules of evidence specifically provide for the admission
of hearsay statements made by child-victims in criminal sexual abuse cases. See ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/115-10 (West 1992); see also ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
725, § 5/115-13 (West 1992) (allowing the admission of statements made to medical
personnel by victims of sex offenses).
If the court finds that the circumstances and statements "provide sufficient safeguards
of reliability," and that the child either testified at the hearing or is unavailable to
testify, the court may admit the statements. See People v. Coleman, 563 N.E.2d 1010,
1020-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1991); People v.
Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1341-42 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that a child may be
unavailable as a witness if the child's unavailability is due to fear, inability to
communicate, or incompetence), appeal denied, 553 N.E.2d 400 (Il1. 1990).
102. See, e.g., People v. Rushing, 548 N.E.2d 788, 793-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(admitting a statement by a nine-year-old victim in a sexual abuse case given to a doctor
during the examination), appeal denied, 553 N.E.2d 400 (Ill. 1990); People v. White,
555 N.E.2d 1241, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (admitting statement given to a doctor of a
four-year-old during examination in sexual abuse case), judgment affd, 502 U.S. 346
(1992).
103. See, e.g., People v. Nevitt, 553 N.E.2d 368, 375-76 (11. 1990) (admitting a
statement of a three-year-old child abuse victim, made five hours after the incident,
because the statement had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability);
White, 555 N.E.2d at 1255.
104. 601 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. 1992).
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ments in child sexual abuse cases.'0 5 In refusing to adopt additional
procedural safeguards, the supreme court relied on Idaho v. Wright,'06
in which the United States Supreme Court rejected the same
argument.'O° Therefore, Illinois courts have made clear that the Illinois
Confrontation Clause does not give a defendant the absolute right to
confront a child witness face-to-face."~
D. The Illinois Child Shield Act
Recognizing that instances of child abuse and neglect are increasing
rampantly, the Illinois General Assembly has adopted many programs
and procedures to protect these child-victims.' 0 9 In an attempt to
protect child-victim witnesses, Illinois passed its first child shield law
in 1987, allowing videotaped testimony to be admitted." 0 Subsequently, in People v. Bastien,' l the Illinois Supreme Court struck
down the law because the law failed to provide for contemporaneous
cross-examination during the videotaping." 2 In response to this
105. Id. at 741. The defendant in Wittenmyer argued that statements made to the
police in child criminal abuse cases should be videotaped or tape recorded rather than
handwritten to insure their reliability. Id.
106. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
107. Id. at 818 ("[W]e do not believe the Constitution imposes a fixed set of
procedural prerequisites to the admission of such statements at trial.").
108. See People v. Fiddler, 258 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ill. 1970) (citing Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965))
(recognizing exceptions to the constitutional right of confrontation).
109. See 1992 ABUSE & NEGLECT STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 28. In 1980, Illinois
redesigned its state child protection system. Id. The state's current programs include the
Positive Youth Development Program, the Child Abuse Prevention Fund, Crises
Nurseries, the Respite Care Projects, and the Cocaine Baby Helpline. Id. In 1981, the
Illinois Department of Children and Family services set up a child abuse hotline. Id. at
6. Since its inception, the amount of incoming calls to the hotline has increased from
111,736 in 1982 to 322,748 in 1992. Id. at 7. See also ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 325,
§ 5/3 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (defining "abused child"); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
325, § 5/4 (West 1992) (imposing a duty on medical personnel to report cases of child
abuse); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 325, § 5/5 (West 1992) (granting certain individuals
the authority to take protective custody of children suspected of being abused); ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 325, § 5/4.1 (West 1992) (defining the responsibility of the state
to investigate the death of any child suspected of dying as the result of child abuse).
110. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, §§ 106A-1 to -5 (1992), repealed by 1992
I11.Laws 345. The former Child Shield Act allowed videotaped testimony to be taken
outside the courtroom and used at trial. Id. The defendant and the defendant's attorney
were allowed to be present during the taping. Id. Only the court and the prosecution,
however, were allowed to question the child. Id.
111. 541 N.E.2d 670 (I11.1989).
112. Id. at 671, 677. The Bastien court explained that under the Illinois rules of
evidence, no recognized exception existed that would allow the introduction of this type
of hearsay. Id. at 674. As such, the court held that prohibiting a defendant from crossexamining a witness at the time that the testimony was taken violated the truth-seeking
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decision, the General Assembly passed the current Child Shield Act." 3
The current Child Shield Act.. 4 allows a child-victim of sexual
abuse' to testify via one-way closed-circuit television, outside the
function of the confrontation clause and, thus, the court found the statute
unconstitutional. Id. at 677.
113. David Heckleman, Edgar Signs Bill to Allow Closed Circuit TV Testimony of
Abused Children, CHi. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 10, 1991, at 3.
114. 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5/106B-5. Specifically,
the amended Illinois Child Shield Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) In a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense of criminal sexual
assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or
aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a court may order that the testimony of a
child victim under the age of 18 years be taken outside the courtroom and
shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit television if:
(1) the testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(2) the judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate or that the child will suffer
severe emotional distress that is likely to cause the child to suffer severe
adverse effects.
(b) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the
judge may question the child.
(c) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to
be unobtrusive.
(d) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when the
child testifies by closed circuit television:
(1) the prosecuting attorney;
(2) the attorney for the defendant;
(3) the judge;
(4) the operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(5) any person or persons whose presence, in the opinion of the court,
contributes to the well-being of the child, including a person who has dealt
with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse, a parent or
guardian of the child, and court security personnel.
(e) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the defendant
shall be in the courtroom and shall not communicate with the jury if the cause
is being heard before a jury.
(f) The defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons in the
room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic method.
(g) The provisions of this Section do not apply if the defendant represents
himself pro se.
(h) This section may not be intepreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant
in the courtroom at the same time.
Id.
115. The Illinois Child Shield Act protects child-victims of criminal sexual assault,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated criminal sexual
abuse. 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5-106B-5.
"Criminal sexual assault" of a child is defined as follows:
(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:...
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(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 18
years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family
member; or
(4) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was at least 13
years of age but under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the
accused was 17 years of age or over and held a position of trust, authority or
supervision in relation to the victim.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-13 (West 1993).
"Aggravated criminal sexual assault" of a child is defined as follows:
(b) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if:
(1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an act of sexual
penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the act was
committed; or
(2) the accused was under 17 years of age and (i) commits an act of sexual
penetration with a victim who was under 9 years of age when the act was
committed; or (ii) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who
was at least 9 years of age but under 13 years of age when the act was
committed and the accused used force or threat of force to commit the act.
Id. § 5/12-14(b).
"Criminal sexual abuse" of a child is defined as follows:
(b) The accused commits criminal sexual abuse if the accused was under 17
years of age and commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a
victim who was at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age when the act
was committed.
(c) The accused commits criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act of
sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years of
age but under 17 years of age and the accused was less than 5 years older than
the victim.
Id. § 5/12-15(b), (c).
"Aggravated criminal sexual abuse" of a child is defined as follows:
(b) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits
an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was under 18 years of age when the
act was committed and the accused was a family member.
(c) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if:
(1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and (i) commits an act of sexual
conduct with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the act was
committed; or (ii) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was
at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age when the act was committed
and the accused used force or threat of force to commit the act; or
(2) the accused was under 17 years of age and (i) commits an act of sexual
conduct with a victim who was under 9 years of age when the act was
committed; or (ii) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was
at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age when the act was committed
and the accused used force or threat of force to commit the act.
(d) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits
an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least
13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the accused was at least 5 years
older than the victim.
(f) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits
an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but
under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was 17 years
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presence of the alleged attacker but still subject to cross-examination
by the defendant's attorney."l 6 The current law is virtually identical to
the statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v.
Craig."' Still, the Illinois Supreme Court found this law unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution.
III. DISCUSSION

In People v. Fitzpatrick,"8 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
Child Shield Act violated the Confrontation Clause of the Illinois
Constitution. " 9 In response to this decision, the Illinois General
Assembly proposed, and the Illinois voters ratified, a constitutional
amendment conforming the language of the Illinois Confrontation
Clause to that of the United States Constitution's.'20
A. People v. Fitzpatrick: The Illinois Supreme Court's
Invalidation of the Child Shield Act
1. The Facts and the Opinion'Below
In People v. Fitzpatrick,George Fitzpatrick was charged with seven
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against four of his minor
grandchildren.' 2' At the time the incidents occurred, each of the
grandchildren was under thirteen years of age. 2 2 The State moved for
an order allowing the children to testify by means of a closed-circuit
of age or over and held a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation
to the victim.
Id. § 5/12-16 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
116. 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5/106B-5(d). Essentially,
the Child Shield Act attempts to balance the right of the accused to confront a witness
with the right of a child-victim to escape any injury that might result from testifying in
court. See Gail S. Goodman, Understanding and Improving Children's Testimony in
Child Abuse Cases, 22 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN TODAY 13
(1993). In this report, the author found that children were negatively affected when
required to testify in the presence of someone they feared. Id. at 16.
117. Compare 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5/106B-5
(setting forth the Illinois Child Shield Act) with MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9102 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth the Maryland Child Shield Law). See also supra
note 75 (setting forth the text of the Maryland statute at issue in Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990)).
118. 633 N.E.2d 685 (Ill. 1994).
119. Id. at 688-89.
120. See infra part III.B.
121. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 686. Between June 1, 1989 and June 1, 1991, the
defendant allegedly committed acts of sexual penetration against four of his
grandchildren. Id.
122. Id.
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television under the Illinois Child Shield Act. 23 The State argued that
the children "would suffer serious emotional or other severe adverse
effects, or might be unable to reasonably communicate, absent an
order allowing
their testimony to be presented solely by closed-circuit
124
television."'
The defendant argued that the Child Shield Act violated the Illinois
Confrontation Clause because the Act would not permit him to meet
the witnesses face-to-face as the text of the clause mandates. 125 The
trial court held that the Child Shield Act.violated Article 1, section 8 of
the Illinois Constitution by preventing the defendant from meeting the
witnesses face-to-face. 26 Thus, the trial court denied the motion to27
permit the children to testify by means of a closed-circuit television.'
The State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 603.28
2. The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court framed the central issue in Fitzpatrickas
whether the Child Shield Act violated the confrontation clause of the
Illinois Constitution. 129 Answering in the affirmative, 30 the court
began its discussion by analyzing the principles of statutory construction applicable to constitutional provisions. 3' First, the court
reiterated its primary rule of statutory construction: "[T]o ascertain and
give effect to legislative intent."'3 2 The court then noted that statutory
language best evidences legislative intent. 33 The court reasoned that
since the language in the Illinois Constitution was clear and
unambiguous, the General Assembly's intent was to grant an accused
the absolute right to confront witnesses. '31
The court next evaluated the language of the Illinois Constitution in
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 688-89.
127. Id. at 687.
128. Id. at 686. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 states in relevant part that,
"appeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the United States or this State has been
held invalid ... shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right." ILL. S. CT.
R. 603.
129. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 686.
130. Id. at 688-89.
131. Id. at 687.
132. Id. (citations omitted).
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. Id.
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Craig. 35 Distinguishing Craig, the court explained that the face-toface language in the Illinois Confrontation Clause renders Craig
inapplicable because the United States Constitution has no express
face-to-face language.136 The court further noted that it was not,bound
to follow the lockstep doctrine3 'of constitutional interpretation, and
the Illinois Confrontation Clause differently than
thus could interpret
38
Court.
Craig
the
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision which held that face-to-face language in its
constitution meant that a defendant had a right to a physical face-toface confrontation, and therefore precluded a child from testifying via
one-way television. 3 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that
the language in its constitution clearly expressed the intent of the
legislature and, therefore, refused to depart from the legislative intent
embodied in the text of its constitution. 40 Like the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the Fitzpatrickcourt found the language in the Illinois
Constitution to be clear and unambiguous,141 and thus applied a textual
interpretation instead of the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v.
Act
Craig. 42 Accordingly, the court held that the Illinois Child Shield
43
violates the confrontation clause of the Illinois Constitution.

135. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). For a discussion of Craig, see supra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text.
136. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688. The court emphasized that "[u]nlike its Federal
counterpart, however, article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution clearly,
emphatically and unambiguously requires a 'face to face' confrontation." Id.
The Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness was made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). A State,
however, may provide more protection to its citizens through its state constitution than
the protection given by the United States Constitution. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 91-92 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
137. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lockstep
doctrine.
138. Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 688.
139. Id. The Pennsylvania Constitution grants an accused the right to meet a witness
"face to face." PENN. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
interpreting the statute, stated: "'We have no right to disregard or (unintentionally)
erode or distort any provision of the constitution, especially .where, as here, its plain
and simple language make its meaning unmistakably clear."' Commonwealth v.
Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281, 284 (Penn. 1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Russo, 131 A.2d
83, 88 (Penn. 1957)).
140. Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 282.
141. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687.
142. Id. at 688.
143. Id. at 688-89.

1995]

People v. Fitzpatrick

3'. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Freeman'. criticized the majority
for failing to demonstrate that the substance of the Illinois Confrontation Clause protects different interests than the Confrontation Clause
in the United States Constitution. 4 5 Justice Freeman emphasized that
the court itself previously determined that the Federal and Illinois
146
Confrontation Clauses are meant to protect the same interests.
Thus, he reasoned that "the difference in phraseology can provide no
basis for the distinction the majority seeks to make."' 47
With this conclusion in mind, Justice Freeman next focused on the
majority's dismissal of the Craig interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause.' 8 While he agreed that the Illinois Supreme Court was not
bound to follow United States Supreme Court decisions on similar
state and federal constitutional provisions, Justice Freeman argued that
the court needed a substantive basis to justify a departure from federal
interpretations.' 49 He reasoned that a mere difference in language in a
state constitutional provision was not a substantive reason to depart
from Supreme Court interpretations of a similar federal constitutional
provision. 0 Instead, Justice Freeman explained that the court should
144. Justice Miller joined in Justice Freeman's dissenting opinion. Id. at 692
(Freeman, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 689 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman emphasized that the Illinois
Supreme Court has previously stated that "'[d]espite the language difference, the two
clauses are meant to protect the same interest."' Id. at 690 (Freeman, J., dissenting)
(quoting People v. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Ill. 1976)).
147. Id. at 689 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 690 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
149. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman indicated that in many prior
decisions, including People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317 (Ill. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 94 (1994), the court focused on legislative intent rather than a strictly textual
approach to interpreting a particular constitutional clause. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at
690 (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman stressed that "[u]ntil now, this court has
consistently rejected the majority's approach to constitutional construction as
inadequate." Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317 (Il1.
1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 94 (1994)).
In Levin, the defendant argued that the difference in language between the Illinois
Double Jeopardy Clause and the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause afforded more protection
under the Illinois Constitution. Levin, 623 N.E.2d at 328. The Double Jeopardy Clause
in the Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part "nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S CONST. amend. V. The
Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part that "no person shall be... twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10. The court rejected the
defendant's argument, and suggested that the defendant needed to demonstrate a more
substantive basis than the textual difference to prove that the Illinois Double Jeopardy
Clause was intended to offer greater protection than its federal counterpart. Levin, 623
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look to legislative intent in order to find a substantive basis to depart
from federal interpretations of similar constitutional provisions.' 5 '
Justice Freeman questioned the majority's satisfaction with a "clear
"majority offer[ed] no
and unambiguous" approach especially since the
52
reason why this approach is now sufficient."
Justice Freeman then reviewed the majority's use of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision concerning a similar constitutional
provision. 5 3 To rebut the majority's reliance on the Pennsylvania
interpretation, he cited a Missouri case which followed the reasoning
in Craig, and held that recorded testimony did not violate the state's
constitution
despite the face-to-face language in its confrontation
5
clause. 1
Justice Freeman reasoned that because the Illinois Supreme Court
55
generally relies on the lockstep doctrine, as evidenced in Tennant,1
the court should have applied the Craig test.'56 This is especially true,
he explained, where precedent indicates that there is no substantive57
difference between the Illinois and Federal Confrontation Clauses.1
Justice Freeman concluded his dissent by criticizing the majority for an
unsupported and flawed decision which
"offers no valid basis for the
58
Act."'
Shield
Child
the
of
invalidation
B. The Aftermath of Fitzpatrick: A ConstitutionalAmendment
Initially, the Fitzpatrickdecision nullified the Illinois Child Shield
Act. Within one month, however, the Illinois General Assembly
drafted an amendment 159 to the Illinois Constitution to reverse the
N.E.2d at 328.
151. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 690 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 690 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 691 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman offered State v. Schall, 806
S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 976 (1994), to counterbalance the
majority's use of Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281 (Penn. 1991). Fitzpatrick,
633 N.E.2d at 691 (Freeman, J., dissenting). He argued that both Craig and Schall
permit the deprivation of a face-to-face encounter where "legitimate policy
considerations and adequate safeguards for the reliability of evidence are present." Id.
(Freeman, J., dissenting).
155. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tennant.
156. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 691 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). Arguing that a substantive basis is necessary to
depart from federal interpretations, Justice Freeman emphasized that, "[blecause the
language of our constitution cannot compel the result reached here, the majority leaves
us with a result unsupported by law and flawed in its reasoning." Id. (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
159. S.J. Res. 123, 88th Leg., 1994 I11.Legis. Serv. A-1 (West).
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60 The General Assembly then passed a resolueffects of Fitzpatrick.1
tion which would replace the face-to-face language construed by the
Fitzpatrickcourt as unconstitutional. 16' This new language, giving an
accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him or
her," is essentially the language contained in the United States
Constitution. 162 On November 8, 1994, voters of the State of Illinois
approved the constitutional amendment, 63 thereby changing the
language of the Illinois Constitution,'6'and rendering the Fitzpatrick
decision a nullity.

IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Fitzpatrick Decision
Despite the constitutional amendment which nullifies the holding in
Fitzpatrick, 65 the court's reasoning is instructive because it foreshadows the current Illinois Supreme Court's view on constitutional,
and perhaps statutory, interpretation. By strictly adhering to a textual
approach in Fitzpatrick,166 the court seemingly ignored both the
legislative history of the Illinois Confrontation Clause and the court's
own precedent.
1. Applying Legislative Intent
The Fitzpatrickcourt correctly recognized that "the primary rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative
intent."'' 67 The court nevertheless sidestepped an analysis of the
legislative history of the Illinois Confrontation Clause by determining
that the clear and unambiguous language of the clause negates the need

160. See David Heckelman, Senate Kills Proposal to Create Separate Criminal High
Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 15, 1994, at 1 (explaining that the Senate passed a
resolution 56-0 to change the constitution to reverse the effect of Fitzpatrick); see also
David Heckelman, Deadline Looms for Video Testimony Measure, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Apr. 28, 1994, at 1 (explaining that the house voted 117-0 in favor of the amendment).
161. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 27.
162. See supra note 24 for the relevant text of the United States Constitution.
163. Illinois voters approved the amendment 62.73% in favor, and 37.27% against.
ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL VOTE CAST AT THE GENERAL ELECTION ON
NOVEMBER 8, 1994 at vii (1994).

164. Under the Illinois Constitution, any constitutional amendment must be ratified
by either a majority of those voting in the election or three-fifths of those voting on the
referendum. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (1970).
165. See supra part III.B.
166. See supra note 141-42 and accompanying text.
167. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687.
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to resort to legislative history to determine intent.'1s
The court's reluctance to examine legislative history to determine the
meaning of the Illinois Constitution is flawed because legislative intent
is the basis for statutory construction and is appropriately determined
by a review of legislative history. 6 9 Although the court relied on three
prior Illinois Supreme Court cases 170 to support its failure to review
legislative history to determine legislative intent, 7' these cases did not
involve the interpretation of constitutional provisions, but merely
involved the interpretation of statutory and administrative provisions. 172

While it may be appropriate to determine legislative intent from the
face of statutes, it is far less appropriate to determine legislative intent
from the face of a constitution. 73 The court itself has recognized that
the determination of the legislative intent behind a constitution is better
evidenced by a review of the text and legislative history. 74 In fact, the
168. Id.
169. The court itself has recognized that in departing from federal interpretations, a
court should construe similar provisions in the state and federal constitutions differently
when the language, debates, or committee reports construe similar provisions in a
different way from the United States Supreme Court. People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336,
342 (I11.
1992). The debates and committee reports do not indicate that the Illinois
Confrontation Clause is construed differently than the Federal Confrontation Clause.
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
170. People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin, 607 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill. 1992); Business &
Professional People for the Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 585 N.E.2d
1983).
1032 (Ill. 1991); People v. Boykin, 445 N.E.2d 1174 (I11.
171. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687-88.
172. People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin, 607 N.E.2d 1251, 1252 (I11.1992)
(interpreting sentencing guidelines); Business & Professional People for the Pub.
Interest, 585 N.E.2d at 1037 (interpreting the Public Utilities Act); Boykin, 445 N.E.2d
at 1175 (interpreting a statute relating to eligibility for supervision).
173. See Rock v. Thompson, 426 N.E.2d 891, 901 (Ill. 1981) (holding that "[iun the
construction of a constitution courts should not indulge in speculation apart from the
spirit of the document, or apply so strict a construction as to exclude its real object and
intent.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
1984); see also People v.
174. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 155-56 (I11.
1992) (explaining that the court might depart
DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336, 342-43 (I11.
from federal interpretation of similar constitutional provisions if the language and
legislative history show that the framers of the state constitution intended a different
1988)
meaning); People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 875-76 (Ill.
(examining legislative history in interpreting the right to a trial by jury).
The court's reasoning in Tisler is instructive:
After having accepted the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in deciding
fourth amendment cases as the appropriate construction of the search and
seizure provisions of the Illinois Constitution for so many years, we should
not suddenly change course and go our separate way simply to accommodate
the desire[s] of the defendant.
Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 157.
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court has stated that: "Effective constitutional interpretation requires
that, where possible, provisions be construed in a manner consistent
with other provisions relevant to the same subject matter, and that we
look to the whole enactment to determine its purpose."'' 75 Because the
Fitzpatrickcourt refused to examine the "whole enactment," it failed to
uncover the General Assembly's belief that the Illinois and United
States Confrontation Clauses protect the same interest. 76 Because an
examination of legislative history is far more likely to uncover the true
intent of the framers, 177 the Fitzpatrickcourt set a dangerous precedent
by ignoring legislative history and construing the constitution
narrowly.
Accordingly, the Fitzpatrickcourt should have examined both the
text of the Illinois Confrontation Clause and the legislative history
surrounding its enactment to justify a diversion from federal interpretations of the Sixth Amendment. Such an examination, however,
would have failed to justify striking down the Child Shield Act,
because the two clauses are meant to protect the same interests. 78 The
court, in effect, concluded that the General Assembly intended a defendant's right to confront a child sexual abuse victim to be absolute.
Surely, the Framers of the Illinois Constitution did not envision the
court's conclusion, especially in light of the legislative
Fitzpatrick
179
history.
2. Prior Precedent
As Justice Freeman emphasized in his dissent in Fitzpatrick,80 the
majority ignored precedent in interpreting the meaning of the Illinois
Confrontation Clause.' 8 ' First, the majority did not explain its
departure from its previous explicit statement that "[d]espite the language difference, the ... [Illinois and United States Confrontation
175. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 558 N.E.2d 89, 95
(Ill. 1990) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court in State Board of Elections
also cited, approvingly, Rock v. Thompson, 426 N.E.2d 891 (Ill. 1981). Id.
176. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
177. Even DiGuida, the Fitzpatrick court's authority for diverging from federal
interpretation of similar constitutional provisions, reiterates this principle. People v.
DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336, 342-43 (I11.1992).
178. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. The majority summarily
concluded that a child who is examined out of the presence of the defendant does not
provide the defendant with the face-to-face encounter envisioned by the drafters of the
Illinois Constitution. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687. The court, however, made no
attempt to discern the scope of the drafters' intent. Id.
180. Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 689 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
1 81. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
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Clauses] are meant to protect the same interest."' 82 Since the Child
Shield Act does not hinder an accused's right to cross-examine
witnesses, the Fitzpatrick court could have relied on its prior decision
in Tennant 83 to find the Child Shield Act constitutional.
Second, the Fitzpatrickcourt ignored its established recognition that
the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute.184 Even a
cursory review of the court's prior decisions reveals that its interpretation of the Illinois Confrontation Clause is not static.'85 The court
has consistently upheld exceptions to the right to face-to-face confrontation under Illinois evidence rules. 186 Thus, contrary to the
Fitzpatrick court's reasoning that the "clear and unambiguous"' 87
language of the Illinois Confrontation Clause grants an accused an
"express and unqualified right"'' 88 to a physical confrontation, the
89
Illinois Supreme Court has itself previously held that it does not. 1
182. People v. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (I11. 1976), cert.'denied, 431 U.S.
918 (1977). The Tennant court followed the Supreme Court's analysis beginning with
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Id. In Mattox, the Court described the
purpose of the Confrontation Clause as follows:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil
cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43 .(emphasis added). The Tennant court, in addition to
Mattox, also cited 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. ed., 1974).
Tennant, 358 N.E.2d at 1119.
183. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
185. The court has recognized for almost 100 years such hearsay exceptions as the
testimony from a prior trial exception and the official documents exception. See, e.g.,
Gillespie v. People, 52 N.E. 250 (111. 1899) (allowing transcript from former trial to be
read to jury without violating the right to confrontation); Tucker v. People, 13 N.E. 809
(Ill. 1887) (permitting the. introduction of a marriage certificate to prove bigamy).
186. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of hearsay
exceptions.
187. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687.
188. Id.
189. Justice Freeman suggested that the court's strict plain meaning interpretation of
the confrontation clause could abrogate all hearsay exceptions. Id. at 690 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting). Such a result, however, is unlikely. Just two weeks prior to the decision in
Fitzpatrick,the court in People v. West, 632 N.E.2d 1004 (I11. 1994), faced the issue of
whether the Illinois Constitution requires trial judges to give their rationale for
determining whether the hearsay statements of child abuse victims bear sufficient indicia
of reliability under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10 (1989) (current version at ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994)). This section sets
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B. The ConstitutionalAmendment

The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished Craig based on the "face
to face" language contained in the Illinois Constitution at the time of
the Fitzpatrick decision."9 Since the constitutional amendment deleted
the face-to-face language, and replaced it with language that mirrors
the United States Confrontation Clause,' 9' the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in Craig becomes much more relevant to any
subsequent challenge to the Illinois Child Shield Act. Indeed, if the
the Illinois Supreme Court will likely apply the
new law is challenged,
92
Craig test.
Applying the Craig test, it becomes evident that the Illinois Child
Shield Act comports with the Confrontation Clause of the United
States Constitution. First, the Child Shield Act requires a case-specific
finding that the child-victim will suffer serious emotional distress if
required to testify in the courtroom. 193 Next, the Child Shield Act
requires the trial judge to find that the child will suffer more than de
minimis harm if required to testify in court, satisfying the second
prong of the Craigtest.' 94

Finally, although the Illinois Child Shield Act does not state that
protecting children is an important public policy, the Craig Court did
not require such a recitation to satisfy the final prong of the test.' 95
The Craig Court was satisfied that the protection of child-victims of
criminal sexual abuse is an important public policy since so many

forth the child abuse hearsay exception. West, 632 N.E.2d at 1008. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the trial judge does not have to give the reasons, nor would it
impose such a requirement, and allowed the hearsay statement into evidence. Id.
190. See supra note 19 for the text of the confrontation clause contained in the 1970
Illinois Constitution.
191. See supra note 24 for the text of the Federal Confrontation Clause.
192. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
193. 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5/106B-5(a)(2). The
Illinois Child Shield Act requires that the judge make a finding that the child would be
traumatized by "testifying in the courtroom." Id. This language mirrors the language of
the Maryland statute analyzed by the United States Supreme Court and found to be
constitutional. See supra note 75.
In Craig, the Court held that the trial court must make a specific finding that the
defendant would be the cause of the trauma. 497 U.S. at 860. Because the Illinois Child
Shield Act does not set out a requirement that the child be traumatized by testifying in
front of the defendant, the Illinois Supreme Court could again find the Child Shield Act
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, because this result would clearly be contrary to the
intent of both the Illinois General Assembly and Illinois voters, this result is not
likely.
194. 1994 Child Shield Act Amendment, supra note 13, § 5/106B-5(a)(2).
195. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 853.
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states have enacted protective statutes. 96 Moreover, the Court itself
recognized that a state's interest in "'the protection of minor victims of
sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compelling'
one."' 197 Therefore, due to the protective nature of the Illinois Child
Shield Act, the Act would most likely satisfy the final prong of the
Craigtest.
Based on this analysis, the Child Shield Act will likely withstand
any future constitutional challenges. Although the Illinois Supreme
Court is still not requiredto apply Craig, the clear message sent by the
Illinois General Assembly and voters, coupled with the court's prior
decisions, leaves the court little room to once again side step the Craig
analysis.
V. IMPACT

A. The Impact of Fitzpatrick on ConstitutionalInterpretation
While the constitutional amendment to the Illinois Confrontation98
Clause nullified the impact of Fitzpatrick on the Child Shield Act,
the court's decision set a dangerous precedent for constitutional
interpretation. In the future, when the language of the Illinois Constitution differs from the United States Constitution, the court may apply
a strict textual approach, and in the process ignore clearly defined
legislative intent.' 99 This method of constitutional interpretation could
lead to the invalidation of other laws which comport with legislative
intent, but not the court's interpretation of the language of the Illinois
Constitution. As a result, Illinois voters may again be asked to change
the constitution as a result of Illinois Supreme Court decisions.
B. The Impact of the Child Shield Law on
the Right to Confrontation
Since the constitutional amendment reinstates the Child Shield Act,
some have expressed concern that the new exception to face-to-face
confrontation will undermine the true purpose of the confrontation
clause.2 °° On the contrary, the Child Shield Act will further the
196. Id.
197. Id. at 852 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. of Norfolk County,

457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
198. See supra part III.B.
199. Application of this line of reasoning would follow from the court's opinion in
Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 687.
200. See Michelle Stevens, Child Witness Law Imperils Rights, CHI. SuN TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1994, at 31 (concluding that the law could limit the right to a fair trial and lead
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primary purpose of the confrontation clause by mandating unfettered
cross-examination of child abuse victims in an environment more
conducive to. obtaining the truth from children.2 ' Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the use of closedcircuit televisionin child sexual abuses cases "may well aid a defendant in eliciting favorable testimony from the child witness. 20 2 A
child may actually be more willing to tell the truth out of court than if
required to sit in front of a defendant in court.20 3 Additionally, studies
have indicated that viewing a child's testimony through a television
will not diminish a jury's ability to assess the credibility of the witness, allowing the primary check on false testimony to remain
intact.2' Thus, the purpose of the confrontation clause-to reveal the
truth-should be enhanced by the use of closed-circuit television.
Despite critics' fear that the Child Shield Act will be expanded to
apply to any witness who will suffer emotional trauma, 20 5 neither the
United States Supreme Court nor the Illinois General Assembly has
created any such exception under their respective constitutions. In
balancing the rights of the accused and the victim witness, the Craig
to convicting innocent people); PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 27 (containing
arguments against the proposed amendment, and reasoning that witnesses have endured
and survived face-to-face confrontation, and that the law could diminish the truth-finding
process. The opponents also feared the expansion of the law to include those who suffer
from emotional trauma.).
201. Without the Child Shield Act, the alternative is to allow admission of the
child's hearsay statements without the child testifying at all. This is allowed under the
Illinois evidentiary rules when the child is unavailable. See supra notes 97-108 and
accompanying text. Proof that the child would be so traumatized such that he or she
could not speak can be a basis for proving the child is unavailable. People v. Rocha,
547 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
202. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added).
203. See Gail S. Goodman, Understanding and Improving Children's Testimony, 22
CHILDREN TODAY 13 (1993). The author concluded that fear can affect a child's
willingness to offer information. Id. at 15. Moreover, she also performed a study on the
effect of testimony by closed-circuit television on jurors. Id. She concluded that jurors
found no significant difference in truthfulness by looking at the child on television than
in court. Id.
The medical profession also supports testifying outside the presence of an alleged
attacker as a more productive method of seeking the truth in child sexual abuse cases.
Stephen Ludwig & Allan E. Kornberg, CHILD ABUSE A MEDICAL REFERENCE (2d ed. 1992).

The authors, in examining the Confrontation Clause and its impact in the prosecution of
sexual abusers of children concluded, "[t]o suppose that a frightened young child,
threatened with physical harm or abandonment if molestation is disclosed, will testify
more truthfully in the presence of an accused is dubious at best." Id. at 438.
204. Goodman, supra note 203, at 15. See also supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
205.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 27 (containing arguments against the

proposed amendment, based on the fear that the Act will be expanded to include all those
that may suffer from emotional trauma).
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decision required a finding that the child shield law at issue furthers the
important public policy of protecting child abuse victims. 2°6 Therefore, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court or the Illinois General
Assembly would create an exception to protect other witnesses from
emotional trauma. Hence, while the opponents' concerns over the
Child Shield Act pose legitimate questions, these concerns are not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional analysis in Craig; or the
benefit to victims of child sexual abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the number of reported child abuse cases rising constantly, 2 7
our society must take every appropriate measure to ensure that childvictims are protected in and out of the courtroom. The Illinois Child
Shield Act accomplishes both ends by protecting child abuse victims
from any further trauma which would result from testifying in court,
while still allowing their testimony to be tested by the unfettered right
of cross-examination.
In Fitzpatrick, the Illinois Supreme Court took a dangerous step
when it departed from the lockstep doctrine to invalidate the Child
Shield Act. In addition, the Fitzpatrick court seemingly ignored
evidence that the drafters of the Illinois Confrontation Clause intended
it to protect the same interests as the United States Constitution. Still,
the court failed to follow the Supreme Court's decision in Craig.
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision may signal a new direction for its constitutional interpretation-the authority to interpret the
Illinois Constitution as the court wishes, even if its decision diverges
from clearly defined legislative intent.
On the issue of child protection in the courtroom, however, the
Illinois voters overruled the Illinois Supreme Court. The amendment
to the Illinois Constitution reinstated the Child Shield Act, sending a
message to the Illinois Supreme Court that the protection of childvictims in criminal sexual abuse cases is an important public policy.
THOMAS CONKLIN

206. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.

